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EDITORIAL

Value versus Cost in Taxation
The decision of the United States supreme court, dated May
16, 1921, in the case of La Belle Iron Works versus the United
States, is of unusual interest to accountants in that another wellknown tenet of the accounting profession is now recognized as
the law at least with respect to its bearing upon excess-profits-tax
matters. Appreciation of assets it has been ruled is not an
allowable item of invested capital.
The full text of this decision will be found in the Income-tax
Department of this issue of The Journal of Accountancy.
The corporation involved in this suit acquired ore lands prior
to the year 1904 for which it paid $190,000. Subsequent to
the acquisition and prior to 1912, a valuable deposit of ore was
discovered which it is stated had an actual cash value, at time of
the discovery, of $10,105,400. In the year 1912 the corporation
increased the value of these lands upon its books by adding to
the amount previously shown therein, presumably $9,915,400,
though the printed decision states it at $10,000,000, crediting
surplus account with this amount. In the same year the company
retired its then capital stock and issued in its stead $9,915,000
of preferred stock and a like amount of common. It is assumed
by the court that the preferred stock represented the net assets
at cost and that the common stock represented the speculative
value of the ore lands at that date.
The corporation contended that this increased value of land
should be included in invested capital for excess-profits-tax pur
poses, under the provision of the 1917 Revenue Act as “paid in
or earned surplus and undivided profits.” Second, that within
the meaning of clause 2 of Section 207 of that law, the stock
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of the corporation issued in 1912, including that issued for the
appreciation of the value of its assets, was “the actual cash value
of tangible property paid in other than cash, for stock or shares
in such corporation,” either

“(a) by the tangible assets, including the ore properties
at their increased value, or
(b) by the surrender of all the certificates representing
the old common stock, which, it is said, had an
actual cash value equal to double its par”
and, “Third, that the construction put upon the act by the treasury
department, based, as it is said, not upon value but upon the
single feature of cost, disregarding time of acquisition, would
render the act unconstitutional as a deprivation of property with
out due process under the fifth amendment, because so arbitrary
as to amount in effect to confiscation; and hence that this con
struction must be avoided.”
The court did not interpret the law as supporting the above
contentions and after due deliberation decided against the La Belle
Iron Works.
One can easily imagine the ingenuity shown in the construc
tion of the case for the La Belle Iron Works by its counsel, for
the language of the revenue act of 1917, perhaps, cannot be said
to be so well chosen as to clearly convey its meaning and the clear
intent of the makers of the law.
It has been said that “Language conceals the truth.” Upon
first reading some of the provisions of the revenue act of 1917
the full meaning of the statement contained in the above quota
tion was impressed upon many of us.
No reflection is intended upon the drafters of the law, in fact
we now have a marked appreciation of the wisdom shown in its
construction, for it has stood the test of a number of determined
attacks- We must notice, however, in the decision rendered in
this case, that the court made much of its knowledge of what
congress intended when the law was passed, and in view of the
known intention interpreted the language quite clearly in con
formity therewith.
An instance in point might be cited from the following, quoted
from section 207 of the revenue act of 1917, defining invested
capital :
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“In the case of a corporation or partnership:
(1) Actual cash paid in,
(2) the actual cash value of tangible property paid in
other than cash, for stock or shares in such cor
poration or partnership, at the time of such pay
ment (but in case such tangible property was paid
in prior to January 1, 1914, the actual cash value
of such property as of January 1, 1914, but in no
case to exceed the par value of the original stock
or shares specifically issued therefor), * * *”
The counsel for La Belle Iron Works, it is evident, relied
somewhat upon the language included between the brackets to
support its contention that the appreciation should be included in
invested capital. We fancy this language seemed to fit one phase
of the case of La Belle Iron Works very nicely, the main stum
bling block, however, being the six words just preceding the
matter contained in the parenthesis which read: “at the time of
such payment.” Reading section 207 without intimate knowledge
of the intent of its framers, one might be excused for entertaining
doubt as to whether or not the quoted proviso modified the
definition contained within the brackets.
*
*
*
*
Of the many important decisions of the United States supreme
court during the past two court terms, there seem to be none of
greater importance to accountants than that in which it was de
cided that stock dividends were not to be considered income to
the recipients of the dividend; that in which the court ruled that
the gain realized from sale of capital assets is income; and that
in which the court ruled that the appreciated portion of the value
of assets could not be included in a computation of invested
capital for excess-profits-tax purposes.
There may have been other decisions handed down during
that period of more far-reaching importance, but we can conceive
of none the effect of which is more directly felt by all, than
those bearing upon our comparatively new method of taxing in
come. Federal taxes up to five years ago were exacted in such
an indirect manner that to the mass they meant nothing more
than a somewhat abstruse economic question, which must be de
cided at the polls every four years, but since so many of our
citizens now have to reckon with income tax as a part of their
personal budget, any decision upon these tax matters becomes at
once a subject of considerable moment.
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The daily newspapers devote much space to the subject, not
only to those items dealing with the present law, but to the pro
posed measures to take the place of the excess-profits-tax law,
which latter, the majority of opinion seems to consider as of no
further value; first, for the reason that it is thought that because
of the shrinkage of profits, the law, if left in effect, would fail
as a producer of revenue, and, second, because it has been termed
burdensome to business as a whole.
The particular reason the three above-mentioned decisions seem
to accountants of unusual importance, however, is that in each
instance the court after careful consideration has ruled upon the
various questions brought to its attention strictly in accordance
with the best theory and practice of modern accountancy. The
fact that the supreme court of the United States has passed upon
these matters takes them out of the state in which they may have
been considered more or less controversial and projects them
before the laity as dignified precedents, if not actual rules.
While our brethren of the profession of the law have our
admiration and respect, this attitude toward them we have been
obliged to modify at times upon observing their lack of clear
thinking when they enter the field of accountancy. It is refresh
ing, therefore, when so eminent a body of that profession, as the
supreme court of the United States, observes, as it does in the
case of the La Belle Iron Works versus the United States, that
“There is a logical incongruity in entering upon the books
of a corporation as the capital value of property acquired
for permanent employment in its business and still re
tained for that purpose a sum corresponding not to its
cost but to what probably might be realized by sale in
the market”
or as it observes in the Eisner versus Macomber case:
“Income may be defined as a gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined, provided it be un
derstood to include profit gained through sale or con
version of capital assets.”
That books of account should not be so kept as to reflect
anticipated or unrealized profits is common knowledge in the
accountancy profession; and that the statistics extracted there
from should represent cost and not value is also well known to
accountants, but these facts are not so generally understood by
the laity.
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Value is a term, the meaning of which is illusive. We all use
it more or less intelligently in our daily lives and it is the subject
of daily consideration in our dealings with our fellows, but who
can accurately say what the value of any particular commodity is ?
Richard the Third is quoted as having placed a rather abnormal
value upon a horse at a critical time in his career.
What is the value of unmined ore of a known metallurgical
content, if that accurately could be known, while it is still under
ground? If one could exactly estimate the cost of mining it and
transporting it to its accustomed market and then forecast the
exact waste they would be sustained in the several processes of
producing and transporting it, as well as the exact price that
would be realized upon its sale, the present worth of the profit
that would eventually be realized might be computed. It is difficult
to conceive of any individual or set of individuals who could even
approximate these costs and profits in order to fit themselves
with an authoritative opinion of the value, at any given time,
attaching to the ore in the ground.
In the case of La Belle Iron Works versus the United States
upon which the supreme court gave its opinion May 16, 1921, the
corporation contended that there should be included as invested
capital an appreciation of nine million, nine hundred thousand
dollars, resulting from its appraisal of value of ore in its ground,
which appraisal was made by it in 1912.
Whether the appraised value set up in the corporation’s books
was too high or too low had no bearing upon the subject at
issue and apparently was not considered by the court- That it
has no bearing can be admitted without weakening a desire to
speculate upon what valuation would have been put upon the ore
lands in 1917 or 1918, or, on the other hand, what value would
have been considered proper if congress had considered unearned
increment a proper subject for taxation.
Logically considered, books of account should be kept so as to
reflect cost and not value and this is the theory at the base of
accounting structure. However, accountancy contemplates as a
cost the exhaustion, wear and tear that naturally takes place in
some of the assets for which it sets out to be the financial historian.
As this exhaustion, wear and tear must be the subject of conjec
ture and educated speculation, in endeavoring to estimate this
annual cost, accountancy enters into what has been termed “a
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twilight zone.” But it must be remembered that the accountant
entering this zone, however inaccurate his estimate may be, only
contemplates the cost of the asset subject to the depreciation, and
hence is logical in his pursuit of recording cost and not value.
The recording of depreciation, as often has been pointed out,
does not indicate a desire upon the accountant to show reduction
of value, but rather indicates his desire to show the quota of
original cost that has been lost by natural deterioration, which
must be taken into account if the capital originally invested is to
be kept intact.
Another respect in which accounting departs from a strict
adherence to the idea of reflecting cost is in following the rule of
pricing inventories at “cost or market, whichever is lower.”
While this method is not strictly in accordance with the basic
theory, it has the sanction of the best commercial practice and is
recognized as a necessary departure from the cost method by the
accounting profession on the theory, as has been observed by a
leading member of our profession, that “losses may be admitted,
but profits must be proved.” This observation grew out of the
contemplation of the fact that profits cannot be realized before
sale of the commodity dealt in, but a loss “may be occasioned by
physical destruction or deterioration of property included in an
inventory, or it may be occasioned by shrinkage in market value,”
and where such losses are sustained, “even though not fully con
summated by a sale of the goods, the fact should be recognized.”
The court in one of the closing paragraphs of its printed de
cision, referring, however, simply to capital assets, has put the
thought in a nutshell, in making the following observation:
“Whether in a given case property should be carried
in the capital account at market value rather than at cost
may be a matter of judgment, depending upon circum
stances and the local law. But certainly congress, in
seeking a general rule, reasonably might adopt the cost
basis, resting upon experience rather than anticipation.”

In view of the above quoted language, one cannot resist a
certain degree of curiosity as to what the court had in mind when
it observed

“We intimate no opinion upon the effect of the act with
respect to deductions from cost values of capital assets
because of depreciation or the like; no question of that
kind being involved.”
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Greatly are we tempted to speculate upon the probably un
spoken thought which induced the above expression.
The corporation undoubtedly had computed depletion based
upon the fair market value of the mineral deposit as of March
1, 1913, which value included the appreciation contended for in
this case. It is just possible the court had in mind the apparent
discrepancy in the logic of the theory of allowing fair market
value March 1, 1913, for depreciation and depletion purposes but
not allowing it for purposes of invested capital.
As has been pointed out, there is no real discrepancy here, for
while congress through the adoption of the sixteenth amendment,
for the purpose of determining income, is obliged to recognize as
capital the fair market value of property at March 1, 1913, no
such obligation rested upon it to consider fair market value at
that date, in seeking the basis upon which the taxable portion of
income is to be computed.
We venture no opinion as to that part of the decision which
treats of the disallowance of appreciated value as if it were a
violation of a citizen’s rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment
of the constitution of the United States. This phase is one dear
to the mind accustomed to deal with legal matters and the present
case must be one of great interest to him.
We can sense, however, from the manner in which the court
handled this phase of the subject, that it has been permanently
settled.
The company’s counsel contended that in basing invested capital
upon actual costs to the exclusion of higher estimated values there
was produced arbitrary discriminations raising doubts about its
constitutionality. The court pointed out that the act treats all
corporations and partnerships alike so far as they are similarly
circumstanced, and its conclusion upon this matter was:
“If in its application the tax in particular instances may
seem to bear upon one corporation more than upon
another, this is due to differences in their circumstances,
not to any uncertainty or want of generality in the
tests applied.”
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